THE AMERICAN

LAW REGISTER
FOUNDED 1852.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
DEPARTMENT O

49 0.S
VO.{~

LAW

JANUARY, i901.

No. ji.

THE THREE PRESENT MENACES: THE GENERAL ISSUE. THE GENERAL VERDICT.
PERSONAL JUSTICE.*
I.
THE GENERAL ISSUE.

It is not a paradox but a clear truth, which has the closest

relation to your conduct of your profession, that whilst
the substance of your science is a body of intellectual labor,
is learning of the highest order in other words, arranged
and moulded into a scheme, the most important of your
functions as a lawyer involves the use of that which is not
law, in any sense, but only a method, applicable to every
sphere of man, a method of presentation. In all intercourse
in life there must be observed this art of presentation. It
does not form a part of what is dealt in, but only the manner
in which the substantial thing itself is produced to your view,
that you may reach conclusions upon it. It is, as Selden
said of Logic, "the means both of attaining to, and of regu*An address delivered before the Law Department of the University of
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lating, the other sciences." (Essay of Fleta, 128.) If you
are not a pleader you may be a sound lawyer in the mastery
of the learning of the ages, but you lack the function or
power which is necessary to your action as a practitioner
and you must remain obscure in the ranks of your class and
no more powerful than an intelligent layman. Pleading
is not the law; is outside of the law; is not specially related
to the law. Pleading, when correct, displays and emphasizes the law, which exists independently of its agency and
can never be interpreted, enlarged, abated, or in any degree
affected thereby. Pleading may be likened to the telescope
which makes manifest the stars and other structures of our
universe, whether of high origin or of man's hand. If you
do not correctly employ this agency you can never make
manifest the fixed and enlightening principles of the law
which illumine the highest plane of human development and
you have no power as a practitioner. To practice you must
plead. Everything in the administration of justice, where
there is a contest, depends on pleading. And so far as it is
employed in its association with the science of law, it has become a science in itself, a subsidiary science, a logic or special
application, exercising faculties which are not often aroused
in the study of law alone. All this you already know, and
for the science it may be safely assumed that you feel the
respect and admiration natural to a learned man in the contemplation of that form of intellectual power which has
most attracted him. It is at this point that I wish to refer
to the state of mind of some men as to pleading, and to the
status of the science itself. You doubtless now also know
enough of the history of the practice of the law to have
measured the prejudice which has slowly undermined the
reputation of what was a long while winning favor, and at
length gained the respect and fear of the laity, and the
reverent awe of the initiated. Pleading and special pleading
have come to be discredited. In no court in England or
America to-day could you frame the record in a cause in
what Baron Parke would have pronounced the only proper
form; and the achievement of a surrejoinder has for years
been absolutely impossible. Yet a surrejoinder was well
reached in Professor Minor's example for students (Minor's
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Institutes IV, 554-555), which is approved and reproduced
to us by Perry (Pleading, 227). And Reeves abstracts
from Mayn (634) the case of Aleyne de Newton's writ of
annuity against the Abbot of Burton-upon-Trent, in which
they went on to reply, rejoin and surrejoin (II,221,Finlason,
1896). The London Times of nineteen years ago (October 8,
1881), shows the report ofacommitteeappointed bythe Chancellor, which recommends that cases be disposed of without
pleadings of any nature (Thayer, Evid., 367). Some scant
respect is yet afforded what we call a general issue, but
special pleading, or the gradual elimination by written altercation of matter not directly pertinent to the thing disputed
has been abandoned. Yet we are told that this means
merely the accomplishment of an abandonment or disuse
in form; that the abandonment or disuse of the substance or
necessary habit of special pleading-a habit as essential as
the habit of speech-has not been accomplished, and is impossible; and it is complained that the result has been waste
of time in all manner of pleading ore tenus. The process
which once went on in the chambers of the specialists like
Sergeant Saunders, and thus prepared a cause for the judges
to await them as they made the circuit, is now postponed till
the trial opens, and most of the rulings at nisi prius upon
offers of proof are rulings upon pleaders mutually debating
at bar so as to reach an issue of fact. Our trials are vastly
longer in consequence; and much of this would be avoided
if the written pleadings were still precise, as of old. Your
attention may be called to other considerations of the situation which are of greater weight.
Has it occurred to you in your reading to ask, what is the
trend and significance of the alleged reforms in pleading?
These have been said to be, the simplification of the method
of proceeding and the securing of a wider or broader justice,
so that scholasticism, which is cramping and ungenerous and
exclusive of the many, may be dismissed, and the worthy
litigant may have the benefit of the exhibition of all conceivable things that are to be shown in his behalf. We hear
to-day of the benefit of the open door in international commerce. The object which many declare they discover in the
alleged reforms is to secure to the unlearned the open door
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in the practice of the law, so that he may offer his untrained
and honest brain for ministration at the bar of the court,
and propound his various and unclassified suggestions as
they bubble up in his worthy and self-respecting head, for
estimate and appraisement by the Judge, as if they were of
scientific value and thus worthy of estimation and appraisement. This is certainly the consequence which has been
pointed- at in the manner of pleading ore tenus. The expression-"General"-with many of us has magic: it signifies that which is beneficent, as the antithetic-"Special"provokes a frown.
How are you to examine this state of things, and characterize it and decide whether it is good or bad? If you examine it historically you will find it to be a process which
has gone on for all historic ages, and will go on while civilization continues; if you correctly characterize it you will
drop the word reform, and suppress adjectives of belittlement, and instead, call it a development. How you are to
say that it is g6od, or is bad, I hope to show ere I close this
paper. We will begin the examination by instantly showing
certain elements of bad condition. The result of the new
course has been the prevalence of two strongly marked
features or circumstances of jurisprudence. They are, I
admit, to-day two menaces to jurisprudence of which, I also
admit, we must beware; and with these menaces must be
reckoned a third which is neither a circumstance nor a
feature but a doctrine or informing spirit which has produced the change and now influences quite too deeply as I
confess I. think the administration of the law. The two
menaces are the General Issue and the General Verdict, and
the third menace is the doctrine of Personal Justice. Shall
we fear these three?
The General Issue is a menace because it admits of retort,
which is wild or loose retaliation, in the stead of answer,
which is a pertinent and logical meeting of a proposition advanced.
Let us rest for a few moments on a discussion of pleading.
One need not be anxious that the statement of demand should
be defended from attack, whether the attack of those who
decry procedure in the manner of the intelligent laity, a class
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represented by Bentham and Lieber, or of lawyers themselves
who grow impatient over the scruples of Chitty or of Baron
Parke. The scientific lawyer should concede at once that
any form of statement will serve. The proper statutes of
amendment save elaboration of this point. I do not think
that a case can be indicated in which it has been determined
that upon successful demurrer to a declaration or count a
final judgment has gone in favor of defendant where any
relevant fact has been alleged, and is insisted upon, however
imperfectly. Besides which, the statement may be excluded
from my disquisition, and must be regarded as not pleading,
so far as the discussion and conclusions I have in view are
concerned. It may, indeed, be argued technically that in
no case is the statement a step in pleading, and this upon a
line of reasoning which may as well be briefly sketched now.
Let us keep in mind certain basic or fundamental principles.
What is the object of pleading? It is, immediately, to produce a question for dispute and resolution, in other words
what is known as an issue upon which one stakes his case,
and it is, mediately, to invoke a final adverse judgment.
Pleading would never be entered upon unless a final adverse
judgment was in view, and a final adverse judgment would
never be reached without an issue, because an issue represents a contest between parties, and courts do not enter adverse judgment where there are no parties contending.
What, then, is the final adverse judgment? It is the ascertainment and sanction of a status; in dower the status of
widowhood, in partition the status of coparcenary, in assumpsit the status of contractual obligation, etc., etc. You
will observe that a final adverse judgment is not the establishment of a status, if by that is meant the creation or
setting up of a status, because the status has existed, but has
been disputed, before the pleadings produced the issue, by
which one party affirmed and the other denied it. This
final judgment is an ascertainment in the sense that it discloses, or recognizes as it were, in the sense that it clears up,
a status; and it is a sanction in the sense that it is the support, or power, or life, or the impregnability of the status
as between the parties related to the cause; as between these
the status is beyond attack and hence is the ground of writs
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or orders in the nature of vindication and execution. A
jury finds certain facts and renders a verdict, we will say,
for the plaintiff; on this verdict a court enters judgment;
this judgment ascertains and sanctions a pre-existing status
till then in dispute, and this ascertainment and sanction are
beyond attack, and hence writs may issue upon it; -accordingly we have writs of execution whereby the property of
the party charged is held to answer by way of compensation
of breach of the obligation or of violation of the status. In
most cases this ascertainment of a status puts a litigant in
position to act upon a right, which pending the contest his
adversary has kept under. Now such a right must be
founded in fact and in law; this one feels sure will not be
questioned; a man's right of any kind must flow from his
situation among, and relation to, other men, and mustike
countenanced by the law of the land; but whilst this is so, it
is not less clear that the ascertainment of a right by a court
must result from a dispute of fact alone, or from a dispute
of law alone, or from a dispute involving both. There is
no pleading save where the dispute involves a fact or facts.
We will pause for a moment to take our bearings. It will
be kept in mind thAt what we are determining is that the
statement of demand may be declared to be no part of the
pleading when the proposition is tested technically. To
advance then, take the case of the ascertainment by the court
of a right founded necessarily in fact and in law, but disputed in respect of the law alone. There is thus shut out all
doubt as to the fact. The statement of claim serves as the
datum, or exhibit of a status in fact, which is agreed to by
the demurrer; and the conclusion of law is the only object
of the later controversy. Where there is no question of fact
in the case there can be no contention after statement filed,
save by way of demurrer; and a demurrer to a statement
may be successful or unsuccessful; if successful, it merely
blocks an advance modo et forma on the plaintiff's part.
This does not ascertain a status or right, and hence the
judgment is not final. But all pleading is the means to a
final judgment, and hence in the case supposed the pleading has not yet begun. In order to dispose of this topic
as a whole, let us assume the demurrer to be unsuccessful.
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What then? The defendant suffers under a judgment on
the merits, or he has leave to plead over. If he pleads over,
he must open the way to an issue of fact; whilst if he does
not plead over, he loses by his own default and no issue arises
upon the statement. In these several situations, you will
observe, the statement is not in any sense a pleading, because not part of a contest as to fact. An argument pro and
con upon a naked question of law, is not pleading in the
technical sense of the common lawyer, whether written or
merely oral; if written, it is a brief; if oral, it is that form
of argument which is called pleading, just as an oration of
Cicero's or the Declaration of Independence may be called
pleading. They are pronounced to gain a point in principle.
4This leads up to two suggestions, one of merely general
interest as we pass on, the other of more weighty import;
the first being that these views of the statement of demand
do not arise upon any other step in the pleading as known to
the common law, and as known to us when still there were
steps, that is to say, before the general issue was prescribed
by statute, because upon plea pleaded to a statement of demand the facts at once become involved in the inquiry, and accordingly the framing of an issue is inaugurated and in due
course, and so a final judgment may be looked for. Thus
if the mutual altercation were to run to a plea, or to any
stage beyond a plea, and a demurrer were filed thereto, a
judgment thereon might well be final, because the effect of
the demurrer might be the ascertainment of facts in favor
of one or other of the parties, and the law would be applied
to that state of fact according as the argument upon the demurrer resulted. Here would be the ascertainment by a
court of a status founded in both law and fact. In speaking of a demurrer I always mean demurrer to the substance
of pleading, never to the form; a demurrer to form is not
worthy of the name, or of the long attention of any court.
The other suggestion of the two up to which we have
led is, as I see the matter, that pleading advances upon assertions of fact, or denial of assertions, and never advances
when questions of law only are raised; pleading stops upon
the interposition of a demurrer. A demurrer is no plea.

8

THE THREE PRESENT MENACES: THE GENERAL ISSUE.

Hainton v. Jeffreys, IO Mod. 280. We must, therefore,
see that pleadings are designed for the marshalling of questions of fact, and it is my wish to remind you that these questions must be marshalled by special pleading in writing, as
parts of the record, or by altercations in court by counsel at
bar when they offer evidence under a general issue. The
first-named process is in the control of learned men, who
leave their offices in the course of the labor only to appeal
now and then to the court on demurrer, and it reaches its
result, the issue involved, before the jury is called; the second
is a process which the jury witnesses, and which is directed
by the Judge in ruling upon the offers of proof. One of
these may be better than the other. No matter how this
may be, each is a form of special pleading, and one or other
form is as necessary to a judicial contest upon fact as is
language itself.
It will now be understood why, for the purpose of this disquisition, I am not anxious to defend any form of statement
of demand from attack whether of the superficial or of the respectable class of critics, and also that, whether or not technically it may be regarded as of the pleadings in a cause, I do
not include the statement in the discussion and conclusions
which I have in view. A good pleader asks if any part
of a statement is sufficient in law; if it is, he does not deign
to be interested in any other part. Paston, J., in Y. B. 19,
H. 6, 50, 7, ruled that if a bill be good in substance it is
enough; "car un bill n' ad aucu forme." This meant the
petition, or statement, which 28 Edw. III, c. 8, speaks of indifferently as "a bill of trespass" and "a writ of trespass."
I assume a statement or datum to be present, and thereupon
I proceed to select two words, one of which shall signify
alike the general issue and a line of special pleading, and
the other of which shall signify all other forms of counterstatement--one of which shall signify accuracy and the other
inaccuracy. The best words for this purpose are Answer
and Retort: these have the sanction of etymology and of the
precedents.
It is worth while to glance for a few minutes at the
precedents for my use of the word attswer as meaning a
valid plea.
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Debt by a Woman: Defendant pleads,

That she is outlawed at the suit of J. S., and the plaintiff
pleads No such Record and she was outlawed at the suit of
N. S., and she shall not be Answered, for it is not material
at whose suit she was outlawed. Kitchin on Courts, 4th
edit., 464.
3 H. 6, folio 3. Debt against Executors: to plead Fully
Administered and so Nothing in their Hands, is not double:
for one Answer makes an end of all, that is that they have
Assets. K. 448.
14 H. 4, folio 45. Trespass of his Servant taken the Defendant justifies for that the Father of him which is said to
be Servant held of J. S. in Knight-Service, and that he died
and the land descended to the Infant called Servant being
within age, and that the Defendant by the commandment of
the. said J. S. seised him: the Plaintiff saith Of his own
wrong without such cause: and by Cheney and Hull for that,
that the Defendant hath alleged Special matter, that is,
Tenure by Knights Service, the Plaintiff ought to answer to
the Special matter, and this is no plea. K. 447.
12 Edw. I, folio io. If the Defendant justifie by License
or Commandment of the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff shall not say
Of his own Wrong without such cause, nor if parcel be of
record, for these ought to be answered specially. K. 444.
2 H. 5,folio I. Replegeare, the Defendant avows as
Bayliff for that a Prior held of his Manor by Fealty and
Rent, the Plaintiff saith, Of his own Wrong without such
case: it is no Plea: for here he ought to answer the substance
which is material, that is to say the Lordship. K. 443.
13 H. 7, folio 13. Trespass, the Defendant justifies for
Common appendant and gives in Evidence that he hath
Common by reason of Neighbourhood; it is not good, for it
is not answerable to the matter in Issue. K. 241.
Y. B. Edw. II, 507. A woman claimed dower, alleging
that her husband had endowed her assensu patris, and put
forward a deed which showed the assent. The defendant
traversed; some discussion followed as to how the issue was
to be tried, and as to the effect of the deed. Counsel for defendant said, "The deed which you show effects nothing be-

yond entitling you to an answer."

Counsel for plaintiff.
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"True, but he can only have such issue as the deed requires."
Thayer, Evid. I, 14.
Much at times depends upon definition, but definition
only serves as a temporary anchorage; and one of the mistakes which John Austin made was to assume that it served
once and forever, and that a decision or judgment must go in
one way, because words depended on meant but one thing.
We have learned otherwise, first in the Court of Chancery,
in which at an early day it was ascertained that according
to equity definitions did not define. Next, the Probate
Courts administered relief in the solving of latent ambiguities. And finally the administration at law of the doctrine
of the intent of the parties made the circuit complete. You
recall the case of the I promise-never-to-pay-note. 2 A tkyns,
32. Allan v. Mawson, 4 CamInp. 115. And in Piper v.
the Trust Co., 140 Pa. St. 233, real estate legally passed

under the description of money. We have learned to treat
statutes, contracts, wills, even libels and jurats quite otherwise than as meaning what they say in order that we may
secure the saying of what they mean. I need not enlarge
upon this because I only want to add that just now a definition will serve us. It is Retort which I wish to define.
Answer I have already described as a pertinent and logical
meeting of a proposition advanced, and we will leave it
there. Retort has been called by the French, A Twist
Backward, or Back, a Return by a Twisting and Curving.
This intellectual twist is a disease at last, and we will
examine the disease briefly by way of making and fostering
a dislike for it. Answer, or legitimate pleading, may be
general or special, and valuable in either case; but retort is
general only and has no power to concentrate inquiry. In
answer the issue is material ex necessitate: In retort it is
more likely to be wide of the mark than material because it is
chosen from the broad field of associate ideas and not from
the narrow channel of logical sequence.
If you fail to see the answer, or abandon it in a spirit of
sophistry, or eccentricity, or malevolence, or in ignorance,
retort is sure to flourish, and the reason is that unless one of
two disputants elects to remain silent there must always be
a counterthrust. Retort is an intellectual parry; a parry
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is a diversion of an inquiry from its logical end. The availability of retort is much the greater. A plausible retort is
oftener at hand than an answer that can be sustained, and
accordingly the clients are oftener ready with it, especially
women and the laity, than the profession. This is because
they are not trained. It must be observed that retort provokes retort, and that then only the skilled can use it with
success. When women and the laity fall to it they find disorder, contradiction, confusion, defeat. Consider how
rarely the real or true cause is stated for any line of conduct.
The laity may with reason wonder at the many points upon
which cases are won; the victory they most frequently
deprecate has involved the method of parry, although they
mistakenly find it usually due to technicality, or what they
call the vice of special pleading. Parry sometimes makes
for truth, but much more often it is in perversion of truth.
Special pleading has been discredited and thus has admitted
the efficacy of retort ore tenus. The law (as by a peculiar
courtesy we call that which is not law) of contributory negligence in any common-law court,-for the doctrine of contributory negligence is only just in Admiralty,-is largely
retort, or perverted answer. The defendant wins upon
showing that while he was responsibly careless I was a trifle,
and mainly an unimportant trifle, careless also; in most cases
without damage to him,-mere kitchen dialectics.
These are light and kindly things to be said of retort, but
they disclose the salient features of the disease and they
show a bad thing. After all is said either way I am sure
that there is one deep truth which illustrates the fundamental
unanimity of lawyers, and that is, howsoever many men may
detest the general issue, and again, howsoever many other
men may abhor special pleading, yet they all unite in a contempt for retort.

I wish to illustrate this by reporting in my own way the
case of Myers v. Urich, which arose in 179o, and is in the
first of Binney 25.

James Kelly as assignee of Abraham Ebersoll procured a
foreign attachment against one Myers, and attached moneys
due on bond by one Urich to Myers. He got judgment
against Myers in due course in August, I79O, and a scire
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facias issued against Urich the garnishee to August, 1791,
whereon judgment was entered against Urich in the November next after.
Thus you see the debt was established in August, 179o;
the assets were adjudged in November, i79 i . No execution

issued.
In the meanwhile Urich paid Kelly a large part of the
amount due, and after the judgment of i79I he paid him the
balance. Thus you see the attaching creditor got the money,
but without the cognizance of Myers, whose money it was.
The Act of Assembly of 1705, An Act about Attachments

I Sm. Laws, 45-46, had been disregarded by Urich. That
act provided in effect that a garnishee was not compellable
to pay in such case till bond had been furnished conditioned
to answer to the garnishee's creditor if within a year and a
day the latter should disprove or avoid the alleged indebtedness to the attaching party. This bond had not been
required by, or given to, Urich.
Myers, therefore, in November Term, 1792, sued Urich
for his debt; Urich retorted that he had paid: he said no
more than payment, but craved leave to show the foreign attachment; this was the General Issue and Myers could only
join; only at the trial could he first show that this had not
been such a payment as was pleadable because not made
upon execution or after bond procured. Proofs were taken,
and it was seen that Urich had failed to ans-wer and that his
retort had in it no element of answer because it did not show
that he had paid Myers or had been compelled by law to pay
a stranger to the contract.
The efficacy of special pleading as above the general issue
settled the case on review, in forcing the other side to throw
up the brief: thus, said Duncan for Myers, if this point
had proceeded on special plea I would not have been brought
to court, because a skilled pleader would have shown Urich
in chambers that he had no case that could be validly pleaded,
and there would have been a settlement on his advice or a
speedy judgment; as it is this system of the General Issue,
this idle word payment, has putus to a jury, the loss of time
and the vexation, and then to an imposition upon the court
in banc: for observe:
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Our demand is shown; upon it a plea must be,a. That Urich paid for account of Myers.
b. That he paid under attachment in law, Baker v.
Hill, 3 Keble 627.
c. That the Act of Assembly had been followed. Scarpe
v.Young, Lutw. 985.
d. That pledges had been found. I Brown 162. Dyer
196, pl. 42.
e. And that execution had issued upon the judgment.
Spink v. Tenant, i Roll. Rep. 105.
The defendant could prove none of these, and the case
was nevertheless by the magic of that idle retort, Payment,
carried to nisi prius, for the court in passing upon offers of
proof to do the work which should have been done in the
office of counsel. Thereupon, said Ingersoll for Urich, I
give up the cause.
Special pleading in this instance might have got Myers
his money in November Term, 1792.
The general issue in this instance kept Myers out of his
money till December 28, i8oi, when our Supreme Court
entered judgment, a tribute of nine years to the efficacy of
Retort.
If, therefore, the general issue always led to retort, and
your choice lay between special pleading and the general
issue, it is apparent that you would be steady advocates of
special pleading in order to escape the menace of retort. And
so far as retort is let in by the general issue the latter is a
menace, as I began by saying. We will leave it for a few
moments, that we may turn to the general verdict.
II.
THE GENERAL VERDICT.

Of the verdict of a jury Burke wrote a remarkable sentence in his Essay towards an Abridgment of the British
History. It contains a truth which has not been noted
more than once or twice in any century of the life of the common law and which is rarely had in mind to-day.. He was
describing the jury of the time before Bracton. "They

14

THE THREE PRESENT MENACES: THE GENERAL ISSUE.

were," he said, "rather a sort of evidence than judges; and
from hence is derived that singularity in our laws, that most
of our judgments are given upon verdict, and not upon evidence, contrary to the laws of most other countries.
Neither are our jurors bound, except by one particular
statute, and in particular cases, to observe any positive testimony, but are at liberty to judge upon presumptions."
Vol.
V1, 270. Edit. of 1852.
The significance of this is startling, and its truth is shown
in every respectable authority that is pertinent. Apart
from the exercise of modern statutory functions a common
law judge never finds facts, whilst, being arbiters of the fact,
a jury at common law may find upon presumptions which it
thinks the testimony warrants, but which you would say
were in disregard of the testimony. Palpable error in disregarding the weight of the evidence is not corrected, but
is punished by a common law judge, who must therefore
have first discerned the facts to be the other way, but who
does not enter judgment; he sends the issue to another jury
and so dishonors its derelict predecessor. He thus violates
the privilege of the jury. He dare not adjudge a state of
fact, and he and his predecessors ever since our jurisprudence
began have refused to do so. The law has nothing to do
with the establishment of a status in fact among litigants; it
makes the laymen, the citizens outside of the courts, do this
and then it speaks. This and other things which may be said
show you the narrow scope of the common law. It is an
oracle to which litigants flock after they have made up the
history to be passed upon in their struggle before twelve
men of their own sort. And thus the people of the nation
have a large part in the administration of justice. "Furthermore," says Professor Amos, "there is, no doubt, a scarcely
conscious sentiment that the solemn act of awarding punishment demands the acquiescence of a representative body of
the people as a whole; and that .the jury, however casually
chosen, forms such a representative body." (The Science
of Law, Ch.X.)
Only through the Church have the courts
ever sanctioned a departure from this system and the usurpation of a power which never belonged to a judge non-pontifical. As the ecclesiastics, or judges pontifical as Selden
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called them, would not let their own class be tried for crime
by the law courts, so in respect of the laity as well as of
their own class they extended the wider protection of defying
the law courts when they administered equity. Now these
ecclesiastics and their successors are the only judges who
ever found facts. Do you observe that this is wholly illegal?
A chancellor finds facts and enters judgment upon them.
And the common law courts have submitted ever since the
chancellor began the work, because, at first, the King, who
was the fountain of the law, inspired the chancellor to declare what in conscience was right, and because afterwards
we found that whether the sovereignty was or was not above
the law a chancellor is a minister of justice. In Pennsylvania we bow to a chancellor, but we uphold the common law.
Although we administer equity through common law forms
and thus are sagacious and merciful, yet whilst we are acting
under the common law we will not find facts; we instruct
the jury as to the equities; in procedure which has not the
form of an action at common law we go to a chancellor, that
he may exercise the ancient function of the ecclesiastics and
do what it is ever impossible to any common law judge to do.
Thus you see facts are found in the administration of
justice by a body of men who are not judges at common law
and who may find upon presumptions, which may be another
way of saying that they may find without proof, and from
this has arisen the apprehension as to the general verdict
which is thought to be a menace because it is the juridical
duty of a court to enter judgment upon it and not upon the
facts. In this way it is conceivable that a judgment that
A. is in default is wrong, because according to the facts A.
is not in default, but not the less it must be held right because upon a regular and irreversible verdict.
The consideration that, in a way a jury sometimes also
passes upon the law, heightens the effect of what we have
disclosed, and the result as it might be stated by a disaffected
critic, and as it has been stated by many, is that the community, through its unprofessional representatives, disposes
of property, adjudges answerability in money, pronounces
against integrity and honor, dooms to imprisonment, outside
of the reach of the law, and with such recognition only of
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the law as is involved in taking an oath to well and truly try
an issue according to the evidence and in listening with respect to judicial instructions as the inquiry proceeds. This
criticism comes from the losing party, who is sure that he
was in the right; often from the winning party in order to
glorify himself in winning against odds; it comes thus as of
course; moreover it comes from the philosophic and wellfurnished observer who has nothing at stake. If you pause
at this moment to appreciate the breadth of the description I
have given, does it not come from you? The jury gives no
reason in the general verdict. It is not answerable for a
verdict which a court thinks wrong. It concludes everything in uttering but one word, plaintiff or defendant. This
power is thought by many to be a menace.
I offer, as an illustration of my hints, the case of William
Hopkins v. Lazarus Tilman, reported in the 25th of the
Georgia Reports, p. 212.
Action for breach of warranty to August Term, 1858.
Hopkins sued Lazarus on the grouund that he had failed
to observe his contract which was in writing, the vital part
of which was as follows: "Received December 31, 1853, of
William Hopkins six hundred and fifty dollars in full payment for a negro woman named Catharine, about seventeen
years old, whom I warrant to be sound in body and mind."
Hopkins demanded damages, as the negress had been unsound at the time of sale.
Walter Ector swore that the girl was healthy at thirteen.
Dr. Reese swore that he thought she was malingering in
the spring or summer of 1853 or 1854; he apparently could
not tell which. Dr. Hood testified that he saw her in the
spring of 1854, and that he had no doubt she then had a fit.
Milton Hopkins testified that she had a fit about February I,
1854, and since that time she had had four other fits-had
had about two fits every month; her fits were gradually
growing worse, were severe, and her mind was impaired.
Zimmerman Hopkins corroborated this. William Hood
swore that he saw her in a fit in May, 1854. Plaintiff tendered a return of the negro at the end of May, 1854.
You exclude the testimony of Ector and Reese as one irrelevant, as not followed up; the other incompetent. You
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must accept the deduction that, after the end of May, 1854,
the negro did not get well, as otherwise the fact would
have been shown. You have then only to consider whether
the deduction that she was sound on the last of the year 1853,
although one month later and continuously since she was not,
was justifiable upon the proofs. The jury found that she
was. How could you review this general verdict? Observe: there was no evidence that the negro Catharine of
about seventeen years of age had been sound at any time
after thirteen. There was the necessary implication that
she was unsound from some time in February, 1854, continuously. There was the proof by witnesses that she had
fits just a month after the warranty, growing more frequent and more serious up to the time of return tendered.
How could the plaintiff under the circumstances, for we
must respect the circumstances, have more clearly shown the
unsoundness? And do you think that if the jury had been
confined to a special verdict the finding would have been the
same? Could they have found that this radical defect had
arisen between December 31, 1853, and February 1, 1854?
had developed to this acute stage in thirty days? The
Apellate Court declined to reverse the judgment. There
was a like case in our state, arising forty-five years earlier.
where a note was given for a negro boy sold for a term of
years, and the jury found the boy unsound upon presumptions drawn from like evidence: McDowell v. Burd, 6
Binn. 198. These are notable precedents, and in the line of
scientific or juridical propriety, and yet it must be allowed
that Hopkins v. Tilman illustrates the menace that lies in
the general verdict and should not be followed, as it is not
followed, in actions of tort of the present time, especially in
those which lie for injuries to the person, wherein are two
grave dangers, the danger of a jury in a general verdict
acting upon prejudice against corporations, and the danger
even in the case of a proper verdict, of a jury's assessing the
damages in excess of the due measure. Surely, it appears
often that the revision of a general verdict as against the
weight of the evidence is incumbent upon the court.
(To be Continued.)
William W. Wiltbank.

